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COMPROMISING THE HEARSAY RULE: THE
FALLACY OF RES GESTAE RELIABILITY
James Donald Moorehead*
I. INTRODUCTION
Would you entrust your life to the judgment or perception of a
person who is acting under extreme stress or trauma? Do you trust
your own ability to reason and think clearly under duress? Do you
believe that a descriptive statement made at the precise moment of
observation is always reliable? Affirmative answers to these questions
lie at the heart of the res gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule.' This
Article argues that the answer to each question should be "No" and,
therefore, that the res gestae exceptions should be abolished. By
nature, this argument is controversial because it directly contravenes
the trend in judicial decisionmaking, generally supported by modem
evidence scholarship, to admit more, not less, hearsay.2
Historically, judges and legal scholars justified the courtroom
admission of res gestae3 hearsay on the theory that exclamations
* J.D., Yale Law School. For their guidance and encouragement, the author would
like to thank Professor Stephen L. Carter, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at
Yale Law School and Professor Faust F. Rossi, Samuel L. Liebowitz Professor of Trial
Techniques at Cornell Law School. The opinions in this article are, of course, the author's
own.
1. At common law the res gestae exceptions included statements, utterances, and
exclamations that surrounded the perceived event. See, e.g., 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAV § 1768 (Chadbourn Rev. 1976) [hereinafter
WIGMOREICHADBOURN].
2. See generally Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 LITIG. 13, 13-17 (1983)
(discussing the recent development of theories and precedent allowing the admission of
almost all proabative hearsay). Professor Rossi comments that "the ban on hearsay is now
almost a fiction." Id. at 13. The driving force behind this judicial and academic trend
appears to be a widely held belief, discussed in part II.A.3, that jurors are capable of
understanding hearsay and the unique problems associated with its admission.
3. The term res gestae, as used in this Article, refers to those exceptions found in
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1), (2), and (3), along with other state rules that essentially
mimic the Federal Rules. See infra part II.C.
Res gestae means, literally, things or things happened. Therefore, to be
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, words spoken, thoughts
expressed, and gestures made, must all be so closely connected to the occurrence
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spontaneously uttered during the excitement of a stressful event, or
statements contemporaneously describing a non-stressful event, are
made without forethought and therefore are likely to be trustworthy.
4
According to proponents of the exception, either stress, or the close
association between statement and event, provides a measure of
reliability and diminishes the possibility of reflective thought and
fabrication.' Thus, judges often admitted res gestae statements in
spite of the fact that they were hearsay.' As this Article will
or event in both time and substance as to be a part of the happening.
McCandless v. Inland N.W. Film Serv., Inc., 392 P.2d 613, 618 (Wash. 1964).
This Article uses the term res gestae because of its historical reference, and because
the modem exceptions to the hearsay rule that are based on res gestae principles are still
supported solely by their historical justifications.
The term res gestae has been criticized by many, including Wigmore, because of its
imprecise meaning. 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1767 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
WIGMORE]. Wigmore believed that the term "ought therefore wholly to be repudiated,
as a vicious element in our legal phraseology." Id. Edmund Morgan also showed disdain
for the term:
The marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning,
and the confusion of thought inevitably accompanying the use of inaccurate
terminology, are nowhere better illustrated than in the decisions dealing with the
admissibility of evidence as "res gestae." It is probable that this troublesome
expression owes its existence and persistence in our law of evidence to an
inclination of judges and lawyers to avoid the toilsome exertion of exact analysis
and precise thinking.
Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae,
31 YALE LJ. 229, 229 (1922).
In a recent article one commentator noted the continued use of the phrase by today's
judges. David Schlueter, Res Gestae Revisited, 56 TEX. B. J. 667, 667 (1993) ("[T]he court
simply stated '[w]e hold the trial court properly found the evidence was part of the res
gestae and was not hearsay."' (quoting Rhodes v. Batilla, 848 S.W.2d 833, 847 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993))).
4. See generally WIGMORE/CHADBOURN, supra note 1, §§ 1747, 1749 (citing various
authority justifying the admission of res gestae hearsay on this theory).
5. Id. § 1747, at 195.
6. Use of the term res gestae to identify exceptions to the hearsay rule should be
distinguished from the use of the term to connote the admission of nontestimonial evi-
dence closely associated with an event. See People v. Sceravino, 598 N.Y.S.2d 296, 297
(App. Div. 1993); Preston v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 398,400-01 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966).
For instance, in Sceravino, the court concluded that "the evidence of both the uncharged
assaults and the additional rapes and sodomies was properly admitted as part of the res
gestae." Sceravino, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 297; see also Preston, 406 S.W.2d at 400-01 (citation
omitted):
[C]ourts in general have reduced the term "res gestae" to a useless and
misleading shibboleth by embracing within it two separate and distinct categories
of verbal statements .... When the utterance of certain words constitutes or is
part of the details of an act, occurrence or transaction which in itself is relevant
and provable, the utterance may be proved as a verbal act, just as may be a
visual observation of an event. This is not hearsay evidence; it is not admitted
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examine, the early nineteenth century beliefs about the nature of res
gestae statements have not withstood the test of time or the scrutiny
of modem commentators. Yet the practice of admitting such
evidence continues under the same reasoning.
The hearsay rule excludes evidence because of a justifiable
concern over erroneous judgments and their impact. On their face,
the principles governing the admission of hearsay at trial are
straightforward. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."7  In everyday conversation, we might refer to
hearsay as "second hand information." In theory, the rule operates
under a simple premise: Hearsay is not admissible because it is
unreliable, and therefore, more prejudicial than probative.8 But
because the elimination of hearsay means withholding information
from the trier of fact, exceptions to the rule have developed.' The
hearsay rule and its exceptions exist in order to add a measure of
reliability to adjudicative decisionmaking.'0 Therefore, the question
concerning each categorical exception must be, does this exception
ensure some degree of confidence in the hearsay statement?
The exceptions once commonly known as res gestae comprise a
significant part of the modern hearsay framework. Today, these
exceptions are generally codified in Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1),
Present Sense Impression;" 803(2), Excited Utterance; 2 and 803(3),
Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition or State of
Mind.13 Furthermore, most states have a codified version of the res
gestae exceptions, often derived in part from the Federal Rules. 4
Courts apply the exceptions in both civil and criminal trials. But the
for the purpose of proving the truth of what was said, but for the purpose of
describing the relevant details of what took place.
7. FED. R. EVID. 801(C).
8. See, e.g., 5 WIGMOREICHADBOURN, supra note 1, §§ 1362-1363.
9. Id § 1420.
10. Id.
11. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
12. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
13. FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
14. All 50 states recognize some form of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion, based
on excitement, contemporaneity, or both. DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 144
(3d ed. 1991) (citing the corresponding statutes from all 50 states). For a discussion of
how one state's hearsay schema was derived from the Federal Rules, see Alfred H. Knight,
III, The Federal Influence on the Tennessee Hearsay Rule, 57 TENN. L. REv. 117 (1989).
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magnitude of the problem is perhaps best observed in the willingness
of courts to rely on these questionable exceptions in individual
criminal convictions. For instance, in the twenty-four-month period
between April 30, 1993 and May 1, 1995, the United States Courts of
Appeals published eighteen opinions reviewing criminal appeals in
which one of the three federal res gestae exceptions was either used
in the prosecution's conviction of the defendant, denied use when
offered by the defense, or relied upon by the state in an attempt to
overturn the district court's grant of habeas corpus. 5 In fifteen of
these appeals, or eighty-three percent, the state prevailed.16 During
the same period, the appellate courts of New York heard twelve
criminal appeals concerning similar evidentiary rulings and affirmed
eleven of these twelve convictions. 7 This Article argues that the res
15. United States v. Rivera, 43 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Brewer, 36 F.3d 266,271-72 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447,452-53 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Winters, 33 F.3d 720, 722-23 (6th Cir. 1994); Turpin v.
Kassulke, 26 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 267-68
(D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Moses, 15 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Fontenot, 14 F.3d 1364, 1371 (9th Cir. 1994); People v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 615 (9th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Macey, 8 F.3d 462, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Johnson, 1 F.3d 727, 729 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ostrander, 999 F.2d 27, 32 (2d
Cir. 1993); United States v. Harwood, 998 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v.
Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126
(10th Cir. 1993).
16. Eight of these convictions were affirmed on the grounds that the hearsay
statement, used by the prosecution, fell within or could have plausibly fallen within one
of the exceptions. Rivera, 43 F.3d at 1296; Sowa, 34 F.3d at 452-53; Clarke, 24 F.3d at 267-
68; Moses, 15 F.3d at 778; Ignacio, 10 F.3d at 615; Ostrander, 999 F.2d at 32; Williams, 993
F.2d at 458; Farley, 992 F.2d at 1126. Five of the convictions were affirmed on the grounds
that the hearsay statement, proffered by the defendant, did not properly fall within one
of the exceptions. Brewer, 36 F.3d at 271-72; Winters, 33 F.3d at 722-23; Fontenot, 14 F.3d
at 1371; Macey, 8 F.3d at 467-68; Harwood, 998 F.2d at 98. One of the convictions was
affirmed on the grounds that, although the hearsay proffered by the defendant fell within
one of the exceptions, the exclusion was harmless error. Johnson, 1 F.3d at 729. In
another case the appellate court vacated a writ of habeas corpus granted to the petitioner
based upon the state's argument that evidence proffered by the state at trial and excluded
by the trial judge should have been admitted under Rule 803(3). Turpin, 26 F.3d at 1401.
The conviction was reversed in only two of the 18 cases. In one the court found that
the hearsay, proffered by the defendant, did fall within Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3).
United States v. Veltman, 6 F.3d 1483, 1495 (11th Cir. 1993). In the other reversal, the
court found that the hearsay used to convict the defendant did not fall within one of the
exceptions. United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1493 (10th Cir. 1993).
17. Ten of the twelve convictions were affirmed on the grounds that the hearsay state-
ment, offered by the prosecution, was properly admitted under one of the exceptions.
People v. Coit, 621 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (App. Div. 1994); People v. Parson, 619 N.Y.S.2d 372
(App. Div. 1994); People v. Buie, 615 N.Y.S.2d 794 (App. Div. 1994); People v. Victor R.,
613 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1994); People v. Castro-Garcia, 612 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div.
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gestae exceptions should be abolished because judges apply them
arbitrarily, and without consideration for the erroneous assumptions
beneath the exceptions; namely, that veracity is the child of remarks
uttered during the stress of excitement or spoken in contemporane-
ous, non-reflective observation.
Unlike the many reformists who advocate outright abolition of
the hearsay rule or a wholly new exclusionary framework for
hearsay, 8 a few commentators propose reform through specific
adjustments in the rule's schema. 9 But the reformists who would
change the contours of the hearsay rule usually fail to articulate
systematically the reasons for retaining the present exclusionary
framework with its list of exceptions.20
In two respects this Article is quite different from the standard
argument: first, by exploring empirical data and normative principles,
1994); People v. Davis, 610 N.Y.S.2d 63 (App. Div. 1994); People v. Woods, 610 N.Y.S.2d
108 (App. Div. 1994); People v. Tortes, 601 N.Y.S.2d 919 (App. Div. 1993); People v.
Perez, 600 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1993); People v. Hawkins, 598 N.Y.S.2d 72 (App. Div.
1993).
One conviction was affirmed on the grounds that the hearsay statement, proffered by
the defendant, did not properly fall within one of the exceptions. People v. Orth, 607
N.Y.S.2d 415 (App. Div. 1994).
The appellate court reversed the conviction in only one case, where the court found
that the excluded hearsay should have been admitted pursuant to the present sense im-
pression exception to the hearsay rule. People v. Leslie, 620 N.Y.S.2d 30 (App. Div. 1994).
18. See Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 495, 519 (1987)
(addressing the "assumption that general knowledge and experience form the basis of
rational decision-making"); Paul J. Brysh, Comment, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35
U. PiTr. L. REV. 609, 609 (1974); Mary Morton, Note, The Hearsay Rule and
Epistemological Suicide, 74 GEO. L.I. 1301,1310 (1986) (asserting that the focus should not
be on the reliability or unreliability of hearsay, but on "what is known about any particular
hearsay statement and whether that is enough to draw a conclusion about the accuracy of
the statement"); Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1786, 1815 (1980) (asserting that "virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good
and bad hearsay are either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate").
19. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual
Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury
Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 431 (1986); Kenneth E. Kraus, Comment, The Recent
Perception Exception to the Hearsay Rule: A Justifiable Track Record, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
1525; Joseph W. Rand, Note, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: The
Futile and Misguided Attempt to Restrain Judicial Discretion, 80 GEo. LJ. 873 (1992).
20. One commentator has recently undertaken the herculean task of describing the
development of the hearsay rule from its inception to current "post-modem" reform
proposals. Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1992). Although Mueller alternately defends and
criticizes various aspects of the rule, it would be misleading to include him in that group
of reformers who systematically argue for a change to the rule.
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the Article articulates and defends the basic tenets of the hearsay
rule; and second, the Article dissects the limited but viable screening
function of the hearsay exceptions. Only then does the Article
proceed to demonstrate how the res gestae exceptions fail to function
as a proper screening device and argue for their abolition.
Part II of this Article presents the theoretical framework under
which the hearsay rule is constructed and describes the way in which
the exceptions to the rule operate as a screening device for wholly
unreliable evidence. Part III describes the primary criticisms that
have been leveled against the rule and attempts to answer these
critics. Part IV explains the theoretical and practical problems with
the res gestae exceptions in light of the underlying theory of the
hearsay schema. Finally, Part V examines the possible alternatives for
admission of probative, reliable hearsay that would otherwise be
excluded without the res gestae exceptions.
II. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE HEARSAY RULE
Before examining the functional aspects of the rule against
hearsay, it is necessary to ask the question, "Why exclude hearsay in
the first place?" To answer this question, it will be helpful to imagine
the following series of events:2
An upscale shopping mall, located in an affluent, predomi-
nantly white suburb, has been experiencing a rise in crime.
Community and merchant groups have met several times to
discuss their concern over "young thugs" who regularly loiter
throughout the mall. Patronage of the mall has decreased
dramatically. The local newspaper recently ran an editorial
opposing a plan to extend the city's subway system from the
predominantly Hispanic and African American populated
central city to the mall.
The day following the editorial, a group of African
American teenagers enters a record store and begins to
browse through the cassette tape section. The manager of
the store keeps a close eye on the group and becomes
suspicious when one of the youths moves his hand to the
21. In addition to exposing the systemic procedural infirmities of the res gestae
exceptions, this hypothetical suggests that the exceptions may serve as a vehicle to
facilitate racial stereotyping and scapegoating. In the hypothetical, an excited utter-
ance-the product of white suburban fear and racism-leads to the conviction of an
innocent African American youth.
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inside of his jacket. As several customers, including the
group of teens, exit through the front entrance, the store's
theft detection device is triggered. The young man who had
seemed suspicious to the manager begins to walk away from
the store quickly, and eventually moves into a fast trot. At
that moment, the manager, who had been working the cash
register, exclaims, "The one in the red hat stole a tape!
That's him running away." Minutes later a mall security
guard apprehends a young African American man wearing
a red cap. Despite the fact that the guard finds no cassette
tapes in the youth's possession, the suspect is arrested and
booked on shoplifting charges.
At the young man's trial, against the vociferous hearsay
objections of defense counsel, the judge allows several
customers to testify as to the store manager's exclamation.
According to the judge, "the circumstances surrounding the
statement clearly render it an 'excited utterance.'" The jury
returns a guilty verdict. When interviewed later, one juror
confesses, "Although the manager seemed less than sure of
what actually happened, there were so many other witnesses
who heard him identify the black man. Besides, he looked
like a troublemaker."
The preceding hypothetical exposes the basic hearsay infirmities,
and demonstrates how an exception to the rule trumps any concern
over such infirmities. Advocates of the hearsay rule often center their
arguments around three problems that arise when hearsay is used in
the formal litigation setting.
A. The Three Problems with Hearsay
In his article explaining the hearsay rule and its exceptions,
Professor Tribe suggests that the hearsay infirmities may be under-
stood by envisioning a "Testimonial Triangle."' Familiarity with the
device employed by Tribe may encourage a better understanding of
the first two hearsay problems. According to Tribe, the trier of fact
must utilize a "chain of inferences whenever a witness testifies in
22. Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REv. 957, 959 (1974).
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court."'  This "chain" has two links, or as Tribe describes them, the
left leg and right leg of the triangle.24
The left leg connects the action or utterance, which becomes
hearsay when testified to, with the supposed belief of the declarant.'
In the previous hypothetical, the utterance of the store manager is
thought to demonstrate his belief at that moment that the young man
had stolen a tape. The "testimonial infirmities" of ambiguity and
insincerity may weaken this leg.
2 6
The right leg of the triangle connects the declarant's supposed
belief with the conclusion to which the belief points. In our example,
when the witness recounts the manager's statement on the stand, the
probable conclusion is that a man fitting the manager's description
stole the tape. This leg may suffer damage if the witness suffers from
the "testimonial infirmities" of erroneous memory or faulty percep-
tion2 7
1. The problem with the declarant and the statement
The first problem with hearsay is that the trier of fact cannot test
the demeanor of the declarant in the course of litigation. This
23. Id. at 958.
24. Id. at 959, 963.
25. Id. at 959.
26. Id.
27. ld. Without mentioning his schematic contribution to the hearsay debate, the
Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence seemed to echo Professor Tribe's
concerns about hearsay. FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's introductory note. The
committee gave four justifications for the exclusionary rule. First, the declarant was not
under oath when making the alleged statement. Id. Second, the declarant did not make
the alleged statement in the courtroom-in the sobering presence of the judge and jury.
Id. Third, the way in which the witness perceived the statement, the ability of the witness
to remember the statement clearly, or the witness's skill in recounting the statement in a
coherent fashion may be faulty. Id. Fourth, the witness recounting hearsay testimony may
be more inclined to disclose selective portions of the declarant's statement, or may be less
candid than she would otherwise be if providing her own version of events, live on the
stand. Id.
Just as Tribe noted the left leg infirmities of declarant ambiguity and insincerity, the
committee's concern that the declarant may have fabricated the testimony appears to lie
at the heart of its first two justifications. Compare Tribe, supra note 22, at 959 (asserting
that ambiguity and insincerity are two infirmities that may occur between the declarant's
act or assertion and the declarant's belief in what his or her act or assertion suggests) with
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's introductory note (discussing a witness's reticence
to falsify testimony in court). Furthermore, Tribe's right leg infirmities of memory and
perception demonstrate a fear of poor witness's performance, also seen in the second two
advisory committee justifications. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note; Tribe,
supra note 22, at 959.
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weakness is the primary problem underpinning the left leg of Tribe's
model. Because the declarent made the statement outside the
courtroom, the jury has no opportunity to evaluate the declarant's
testimony and determine its reliability. Even if the declarant is
available, there is simply no way to conduct a "normal" cross-
examination of the declarant at the time the statement is uttered. In
our hypothetical a profoundly confused, preoccupied, and agitated
store manager may have exclaimed, "The one in the red hat stole a
tape!" but there is no way for the jury to evaluate the declarant's
demeanor at the time of exclamation. Moreover, if the declarant, or
another witness, later gives a persuasive recitation of the statement,
this may only serve to bolster its believability. The first concern
regarding hearsay, therefore, looks exclusively at the behavior,
motives, sincerity, and other attributes of the declarant.
2. The problem with the testimony of the witness
The second hearsay problem, evidenced in the right leg of Tribe's
model, rests, on a concern that the witness may either fail to give a
truthful or accurate account of the declarant's hearsay statement or
that a witness's verbatim account of the declarant's statement may be
extremely misleading. Again, consider our hypothetical where one or
more witnesses have come forward to testify, "All of the sudden,
there was a lot of commotion and I heard the manager yell, 'The one
in the red hat stole a tape!"' Unlike the problem with declarant
reliability, these in-court witnesses are subject to examination before
the trier of fact. Therefore, one might suggest that defects in the
witness's testimony regarding the hearsay should be just as easily
uncovered as defects in non-hearsay testimony. In other words,
absence of cross-examination should not be a concern when address-
ing this second reason for excluding hearsay.
A proponent of the hearsay rule would likely disagree and
suggest that recollections of statements differ greatly from descriptions
of events. 8 The verbal nature of the hearsay communication
presents the problem.29 For instance, it may be difficult to conduct
a probing examination of a witness who is recounting a verbal state-
ment. The witness may simply report, "I heard what I heard." If no
other witness comes forward t6 refute the alleged statement or gives
28. See, e.g., Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 51, 57 (1987).
29. Id. at 57-58.
November 1995]
212 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:203
an alternate version of events, examining the witness about the declar-
ant's utterance is effectively over. After all, what is the cross-
examining attorney to do? Apart from attempts to discredit the
witness by suggesting that the witness was far away, could not hear
the statement, or the witness's testimony is otherwise unreliable, the
statement has been repeated in front of the trier of fact without much
effective resistance. If the witness did not see the incident, but only
heard it, the attorney will be hard-pressed to conduct any meaningful
cross-examination as to the truth of the matter asserted. In contrast,
examination of a witness who is describing a non-verbal incident may
be more successful in probing the details of the event, uncovering
inconsistencies, and pointing to a lack of corroboration on the part of
other witnesses.
3. The problem with jury misperception of the hearsay
The third and final concern driving the arguments in favor of the
hearsay rule centers on the psychological limitations of juries. Simply
stated, the jury may fail to weigh properly the possible infirmities in
the witness's testimony. Jury members who overlook the possibility
that the declarant was confused or had reason to fabricate the
statement, or who consider the hearsay testimony to be of equal
probative value as live testimony, heighten the probability of a verdict
based heavily on hearsay and the likelihood of greater abuse of
hearsay testimony, in the form of outright fabrication or selective
memory. It is not difficult to imagine that the persuasiveness of the
witness who recounts the hearsay statement-rather than the
reliability of the hearsay itself-may have a direct bearing on the
weight given to the statement by the jury.31 For instance, one might
assume that the party to whom the hearsay is detrimental would
rather hear the statement recounted on the stand by a homeless
alcoholic than by a prominent neurosurgeon. Such prejudices may
affect the jury regardless of the quality of the declarant's statement or
the extent to which the witness's testimony is impeached. Although
30. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH
TO EVIDENCE 520-21 (2d ed. 1982).
31. "[P]ractitioners strongly believe that juries, and to some extent judges, decide cases
largely on what they see happening in the courtroom. Practitioners see, in other words,
a danger that factfinders may misappraise hearsay because they attribute to remote state-
ments the credibility of the witness who reports them." Mueler, supra note 20, at 392.
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a lawyer can argue this problem of perceptions to the jury, 2 one
must wonder if reminding the jury of a "good" hearsay statement is
a wise strategy in closing argument.
As demonstrated in our shoplifting example, the cumulative
effect of the hearsay testimony of several witnesses before the jury
may even serve as pseudo-corroboration. The witness testifying not
only recounted the manager's words, but also indirectly supported the
manager's version of events. An example of the way that judges and
juries view repetitive hearsay testimony may help to illustrate this
point. In People v. Torres33 the victim of multiple gunshot wounds,
while laying on a stretcher at the scene of the shooting, made a
"show-up" identification of the defendant who was then in police
custody.' The victim exclaimed, "That's him!"35  Despite the
victim's "conflicting testimony before the grand jury" eight days after
the shooting,36 the appellate court affirmed the trial court's admis-
sion of the hearsay and reached the following disturbing conclusion:
"[Any bolstering created by the repetition of the excited utterance
by two police officers who had heard it, was harmless, as it could not
reasonably have led the jury to believe that there was stronger
identification evidence than actually existed."37 The Torres court's
cursory treatment of the possible corroborative effect of repetitive
hearsay on the jury's decision mandates a closer look at the empirical
data on the subject.
Several recent studies suggest that concerns over jury compe-
tence, especially in the hearsay context, are exaggerated. 8 For
instance, in a study by Margaret Kovera comparing mock juror
reactions to eyewitness testimony and hearsay testimony, 9 evidence
developed under both good and bad witnessing conditions was
presented to the jurors. 4 The study found that "jurors are, in fact,
skeptical of hearsay evidence and capable of differentiating between
32. For instance, the lawyer might remind the jury that, "It doesn't matter how many
witnesses heard the store manager identify the alleged shoplifter if the manager's
statement of identification was erroneous in the first place."
33. 601 N.Y.S.2d 919 (App. Div. 1993).




38. See, e.g., Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and
Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1992).
39. Id. at 709-10.
40. Id. at 709.
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accurate and inaccurate hearsay testimony."4' Furthermore, Kovera
determined, "[tlhe findings that jurors are insensitive to the quality of
eyewitness testimony, yet are sensitive to the relative accuracy of
hearsay evidence, challenge the legal assumption that jurors can
accurately judge the validity of eyewitness testimony but are incapable
of judging the reliability of hearsay testimony."'4 Kovera pointed to
a similar study that presented mock jurors in a criminal trial with
"identical" hearsay and eyewitness evidence and found the conviction
rate lower when hearsay was involved.43 Kovera concluded that
"[tihese findings provide some empirical support for the notion that
the legal system should provide jurors with any information that may
assist them in resolving the case, including hearsay evidence."'"
Other commentators have presented similar empirical data but
have declined to support such wholesale inclusion of hearsay.
45
According to Stephan Landsman and Richard Rakos, "hearsay that
was not highlighted as inappropriate, and that was introduced within
the context of a substantial volume of other evidence, appeared to
exert minimal influence on the ultimate outcome of the trial. 46
Despite presenting empirical data reaching virtually the same
conclusions as Kovera, Landsman and Rakos suggest other justifica-
tions for retention of the hearsay rule.47 Among these are a desire
to maintain public confidence and the appearance of fairness in
judicial decisions, along with a concern over giving "unbridled
discretion" to judges.'
41. Id. at 704.
42. Id. at 720.
43. Id. at 705 (citing Peter Miene et al., The Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, Paper
presented to the American Psychological Association in Boston, Mass. (Aug. 1990)).
44. Id. at 722.
45. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay, A Preliminary
Empirical Enquiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts,
15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 65, 76 (1991).
46. IL
47. Id. at 80-81.
48. Id. (citing Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1357, 1372-75 (1985)); see also Mueller, supra note 20, at 397 ("It is not clear that
judges will perform better without rules to apply. Practitioners strongly believe they need
protection against broad judicial discretion.").
Landsman and Rakos also point to problems in the research methods used to date,
including the inability to replicate courtroom conditions through the presentation of live
testimony, typical deliberation by a jury panel, and use of a representative jury pool.
Landsman & Rakos, supra note 45, at 77-79. An example of this kind of deficiency in
empirical method can be seen in the Kovera study, where the differences between the
typical trial juror profile and the study's mock juror profiles were stark, as were the
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In a separate article, written as a companion to the Kovera study,
Rakos and Landsman conclude that "[t]here has not yet been enough
hearsay research to warrant a discussion of reform on empirical
grounds."49 The authors cite several examples of specific concerns
that have not been sufficiently studied, including "how large a ratio
of hearsay to nonhearsay statements jurors are able to handle effect-
ively,"' and whether "voir dire procedures [can] be developed to
identify jurors unable to weigh the second-hand nature of hearsay
competently."'" Even Kovera ends her article with the caveat that
"[t]he juror's evaluation of hearsay might differ ... in a case with a
great deal of emotional appeal."'52 And although Kovera and others
suggest that problems of jury overemphasis may be cured by judicial
instruction, 3 Rakos and Landsman have posited the theory that
judicial admonitions as to the proper weight to be given hearsay may
have the opposite effect of actually encouraging the jury to give the
evidence more weight.'
Despite the infirmities of the various studies, jury misperception
is not as persuasive an argument for excluding hearsay as it once was.
Nevertheless, the absence of more thorough, reliable empirical
studies, the persistent concerns over the reliability of the declarant's
statement and the performance of the witness, and the need for public
confidence in judicial decisions, lead to the conclusion that the
hearsay rule continues to provide an important protective function.5
As the authors of one article argue:
differences in the circumstances surrounding the testimony. Kovera et al., supra note 38,
at 707-10. The Kovera "jury" consisted of 162 undergraduate students who received either
course credit or remuneration for their efforts. Id. at 707. The hearsay testimony was not
presented in a trial setting. Id. at 708-10. Indeed, the hearsay evidence-in the form of
videotaped testimony-immediately followed live testimony and mirrored the live
testimony, thus standing in sharp contrast to the eyewitness testimony. Id. Furthermore,
the hearsay evidence was unaccompanied by any other evidence which would usually be
expected to be presented at trial. Id.
49. Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging
Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L. REV. 655, 676 (1992).
50. Id. at 679.
51. Id. at 681.
52. Kovera et al., supra note 38, at 722.
53. Id. at 721; Jack B. Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D.
375, 377 (1968).
54. Rakos & Landsman, supra note 49, at 661.
55. Mueller notes that "the absence of more extensive empirical evidence has proved
to be a great embarrassment, at least to academic commentators." Mueller, supra note 20,
at 378.
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Hearsay cannot be treated as just another form of evidence
without transforming adjudication into another process. For
the trier of fact, whatever the force of a particular piece of
hearsay, treating hearsay as ordinary evidence always in-
volves a compromise of principle. For that reason, the bur-
den of proof should fall upon those who propose to admit
hearsay evidence into the deliberations of the court .. .6
B. The Purpose of the Hearsay Schema
1. Procedural concerns about hearsay
The hearsay schema overcomes some of the above-mentioned
problems by providing a prophylactic function as the jury considers
the evidence. Hearsay cannot be subjected to the same rigorous
testing that most evidence must endure in the course of litigation,
further exacerbating its already inherent deficiencies. In formulating
the response of the Federal Rules of Evidence to hearsay, the
Advisory Committee pointed to several missing safeguards.'
Among these, the committee voiced its concern that the hearsay
statement is not made under oath, the jury is not given the benefit of
viewing the declarant's demeanor, and, most notably, there is no
opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine the declarant.58 Of
all the potential screens, it is the absence of cross-examination that
has been the linchpin of the hearsay rule.59 It is important to look
briefly at the significant role that cross-examination has played in the
hearsay debate, and the substantial acceptance that the doctrine
continues to receive in the academic community.
2. The impossibility of cross-examination
Wigmore based his entire theory of the hearsay rule on a belief
that "the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error
and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested asser-
56. Mortimer R. Kadish & Michael Davis, Defending the Hearsay Rule, 8 LAW &
PHIL. 332, 349 (1989).
57. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's introductory note.
58. The Advisory Committee's notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence emphasize that
this concern over the lack of cross-examination focuses on both the jury and the witness.
See FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee introductory notes. First, the jury is deprived
the benefit of deriving "valuable clues" from the demeanor of the declarant upon often
rigorous cross-examination. Id. Second, cross-examination is believed to be "effective in
exposing imperfections of perception, memory, and narration." Id.
59. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1362.
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tion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test
of Cross-examination."' Specifically, Wigmore believed that cross-
examination provided four essential elements that are not uncovered
in direct testimony by the proponent or by examination of witnesses
other than the declarant: (1) undisclosed "qualifying circumstances"
under which the statement was made; (2) "facts which diminish the
personal trustworthiness" of the declarant; (3) immediate contrast of
the cross-examination testimony with conflicting direct testimony; and
(4) refutation of the earlier testimony by the declarant.61
Although the availability of the declarant to testify may alleviate
some of these fears, applying our shoplifting hypothetical to Wig-
more's suppositions exposes the reality of the cross-examination
problem-even when the declarant later takes the stand. Imagine
that we have somehow transported the trial, with judge, jury, and
lawyers, to the moments just following the supposed theft and the
store manager's exclamation. Within minutes of the manager's ex-
cited utterance, defense counsel may begin to question the manager
about the "qualifying circumstances" existing at the time. What did
the store manager see? Did the manager have a good look at the al-
leged culprit? What was the store manager doing just before he made
the statement? Although it is true that all of these questions may be
asked of a declarant who later testifies at trial, it seems probable that
the opportunity for studied fabrication, as well as the advent of real
or "convenient" problems with recollection, are more likely when the
declarant/witness presents the statement as attenuated hearsay.62
Likewise, even if the defense attorney uses evidence of the store
manager's personal bias to impeach the hearsay testimony, or offers
conflicting direct testimony to refute the hearsay, the effect, if any, on
the declarant's version of his story may be minimal.63 An unknown
or unavailable declarant only heightens these concerns, such as when
the courts admit statements by anonymous "911" callers under one of
the res gestae exceptions and those statements are only "witnessed to"
60. Id.
61. 6 WIGMOREICHADBOURN, supra note 1, § 1368.
62. See Park, supra note 28, at 57-58. Park maintains that the absence of cross-
examination appears to present an opportunity for abuse because the chance of undetected
ordinary forgetfulness or outright fabrication on the part of the witness is heightened. Id.
63. See id. Park argues that the witness can blame any inconsistency or vagueness in
his testimony on the hearsay nature of the proffered statement. Id. For instance, the
witness may successfully testify without a well-defined account of the time, place, and
circumstances under which the declarant made the alleged statement.
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by a tape recorder.' 4 In these cases, the "qualifying circumstances"
under which the declarant made the statement and the "personal
trustworthiness" of the declarant are unknowable, while cross-exam-
ination of the declarant or recantation by the declarant is impossible.
Although many of Wigmore's suppositions regarding the nature
of human behavior have been refuted by modem scholars,' his
belief in the efficacy of cross-examination still enjoys wide accep-
tance.' The authors of one textbook suggest that of all the safe-
guards that exist to ensure the reliability of evidence
the opportunity to cross-examine is the most important.
Ideally, cross-examination may clear up ambiguity, expose
insincerity, and point out those factors which should lead
jurors to suspect a witness' memory or to question his ability
to observe clearly the events described. In practice, cross-
examination rarely destroys a witness' testimony, but it often
leads to the qualification of unqualified assertions, indicates
motives to deceive, and suggests to the jurors the kind of
critical stance they should take toward the testimony.67
Professor Tribe's assertion that "[t]he basic hearsay problem is that
of forging a reliable chain of inferences, from an act or utterance of
a person not subject to contemporaneous in-court cross-examination
about that act or utterance, to an event that the act or utterance is
supposed to reflect,"' provides further evidence of the acceptance
of Wigmore's baseline assumption. Mueller states that "[c]ross-
examination cannot make.., the witness reliable, but it does give the
defendant a chance to test and challenge their stories so the jury can
evaluate them."69
64. See Ware v. State, 596 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hang Fan
Ko, 589 N.Y.S.2d 162 (App. Div. 1992); see also Mueller, supra note 20, at 393 ("The
connection of an eyewitness to the realities of the events in litigation is fuller than the
connection of an 'earwitness' to statements describing such events, and the testing process
provided by trials works better when the person being tested has firsthand knowledge of
salient facts.").
65. For an exploration of Wigmore's res gestae justifications, see infra part IV.C.
66. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 30, at 352; Mueller, supra note 20, at 391;
Tribe, supra note 22, at 958.
67. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 30, at 352.
68. Tribe, supra note 22, at 958.
69. Mueller, supra note 20, at 391.
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C. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
1. The screening function of the hearsay exceptions
The exceptions to the hearsay rule serve as a "procedural"
substitute for the missing "substantive" reliability check usually
provided by cross-examination. This safeguard allows the jury to
consider the probative value of the hearsay evidence alongside live
testimony. The exceptions serve as a substitute for the screening
typically carried out by the cross-examination of the declarant, the
opportunity for the jury to see the declarant make the statement, and
the oath-taking of the witness in the courtroom. 70 As one commen-
tator observed, "[i]f a hearsay statement is made under circumstances
guaranteeing its accuracy and trustworthiness, the purpose for
exclusion is defeated ... [and] the need for conducting cross-
examination ... is rendered irrelevant."71 Thus, each exception is
believed to possess particular characteristics that ensure a baseline
level of reliability. For instance, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)
provides an exception for public records on the belief that "[t]he
special trustworthiness of official written statements is found in the
declarant's official duty and the high probability that the duty to make
an accurate report has been performed."'72 The indicia of reliability
that scholars and courts have historically identified to justify the res
gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule are outmoded and disproved.'
Ultimately, they fail to carry out their reliability screening duties in
an effective manner.74
2. The purpose of screening and the resulting benefits
The minimal level of reliability ensured by the categorical
exceptions diminishes the concern that the jury may consider hearsay
without adequate regard for its infirmities. As already discussed, the
relative ability of juries to digest adequately and evaluate the inherent
70. See, e.g., Hutchcraft v. Roberts, 809 F. Supp. 846,848 (D. Kan. 1992) ("Reliability
may be inferred if the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception such as an
excited utterance. If the statement does not fall within such a category, it is not admissible
unless theie is a showing of particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.").
71. Kraus, supra note 19, at 1530.
72. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 295, at 287-89 (John
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
73. See infra part III.
74. See infra part IV.
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problems with hearsay remains whether the jury is faced with
screened or unscreened hearsay.75 Suppose that a jury hears two
pieces of evidence, one properly screened under a sound exception,
and another admitted because the opposing counsel failed to object.
Like most evidence, and like all hearsay, the reliability of the first
piece of evidence is not fully guaranteed. However, its successful
passage through a viable screen provides some measure of confidence
that cannot be found in the second piece of evidence. The hearsay
exceptions operate under the assumption that the jury's ability to
properly consider and weigh the hearsay as against live testimony
should be no greater in the case of the first evidence than it is in the
second. Once hearsay is successfully screened, the jury may make its
determination, all the while retaining whatever problems may be
peculiar to human perception. Significantly, then, the theory
underlying the hearsay exceptions is not concerned with the existence,
the absence, or even the questionable nature of empirical data
suggesting the capability of the jury to consider hearsay. Indeed, the
exceptions to the hearsay rule do not guarantee that the jury will
properly weigh the hearsay, but they do ensure against a result that
is based entirely on unreliable, untested hearsay. As Professors Hart
and McNaughton suggest, the hearsay rule and its exceptions "prevent
errant juries from basing an essential finding upon the slender reed
of hearsay evidence."'76
Thus, hearsay that does not come under one of the exceptions is
deemed too unreliable to be admitted. This determination not only
ensures that the opposing litigant is protected from a jury's improper
consideration of wholly unreliable evidence, but also spares the
judicial system the embarrassment of appearing as if the jury has
reached an erroneous result by basing its decision on untested
hearsay.' Interestingly, even the Kovera study, which concludes that
jurors are equipped to evaluate hearsay responsibly, suggests that the
quality of hearsay-its perceived reliability-has a direct impact on
juror perception of, and confidence in, the result they reach.78 It is
not surprising, therefore, that other scholars suggest that judgments
75. See supra part II.A.3.
76. Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response to
Professor Nesson, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1057, 1059 n.8 (1986) (quoting Henry M. Hart & John
T. McNaughton, Some Aspects of Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND
INFERENCE 56 (D. Lerner ed., 1958)).
77. Mueller, supra note 20, at 393.
78. Kovera et al., supra note 38, at 720.
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based heavily on untested hearsay testimony, even "good" hearsay
testimony, may have a negative impact on the general public's and the
litigant's perception of the judicial system. For instance, Mueller
states that the hearsay doctrine reflects process-based concerns over
public respect for judgments:
To achieve this larger purpose, rules of procedure and
evidence should provide reason for confidence that courts
reach correct outcomes by fair means. Probably the hearsay
doctrine serves this function. Although lay people do not
understand the underlying complexities of even the conven-
tional account, surely the doctrine reflects a common
preference to hear from and speak to observers directly, as
happens at trial where live witnesses testify under question-
ing by lawyers. In this respect the doctrine reflects a kind of
common sense to which lay people can relate.79
Hearsay needs to be screened, and each screen must be sound.
Thus far, this Article has argued that the exclusionary principle
and its scheme of exceptions fosters sound judicial decisions and
promotes public confidence in those decisions. But what of the other
side of the coin? What of those critics who maintain that excluding
evidence in a categorical fashion is just as dangerous to the integrity
of the system? The following part of this Article examines the
arguments that critics levy against the hearsay rule and responds to
their arguments.
III. CRITICISM OF THE HEARSAY RULE
A. The Practitioners' View of Hearsay
Christopher Mueller points to broad support for the hearsay rule
among practicing lawyers and suggests that this may indicate a belief
on their part that, in the forensic setting, concrete categories of
evidentiary inclusion and exclusion are preferable to a system of
broad judicial discretion." The fears of practicing lawyers were
perhaps best expressed in a Saturday Review cartoon, which portrayed
79. Mueller, supra note 20, at 395.
80. Id. at 397. Mueller argues that "[i]t is one thing for Judge Weinstein, who is both
a scholar and an extraordinary jurist, to claim judges work better without rules, and quite
another to suppose most judges can do so." Id. (footnote omitted).
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a judge's exclamation, "Sure, it's hearsay-but it's great hearsay" '81
Mueller suggests that scholars who argue for true reform-which, he
says, must result in almost unlimited discretion being given to trial
judges-are "too much attuned to the academic vision of rationality,
and too little attuned to the complexity of concerns underlying the
doctrine."'  Perhaps because of its removal from day-to-day
courtroom activities, the academic community is not 'as acutely aware
of the frightening unpredictability of giving the trial judge broad
discretion over the admission of hearsay. During the debate over the
Federal Rules, one group of trial lawyers warned against "'too great
a measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the predictability of rul-
ing.' "183 The fear of a judicial "free-for-all" may be especially
warranted in state courts where many judges are elected officials and
are probably less trusted, or able, to make sound and unbiased
evidentiary rulings.'
B. Answering the Critics
Critics of the hearsay rule argue that it often excludes reliable
evidence and admits unreliable evidence based on a patchwork of
incoherent principles.' Morgan's famous quote that "a picture of
the hearsay rule with its exceptions would resemble an old-fashioned
crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists,
futurists and surrealists"86 probably articulates the views of numerous
academics. Many of the categorical exceptions, including excited
utterance, state of mind, and present sense impression do not seem
rational when viewed as part of the scheme of exceptions.' For
instance, as will be explored in Part IV of this Article, the term
"trustworthiness" can hardly be used to describe the utterances of a
person made under extreme physical or emotional duress. Further-
more, as previously discussed, some reformers believe that juries can
adequately process hearsay that is freely admitted.8
81. Jon R. Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Exceptions: A New Day
for "Great" Hearsay?, 2 LrrG. 22, 23 (1975).
82. Mueller, supra note 20, at 369.
83. Waltz, supra note 81, at 22.
84. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 30, at 523.
85. See, e.g., Edmund M. Morgan & John M. Maguire, Looking Backward and
Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REv. 909, 921 (1937).
86. Id.
87. See Mueller, supra note 20, at 374.
88. See supra part II.A.3.
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But neither instituting a radically new exclusionary system simply
because some of the exceptions to the old system are intellectually
untenable, nor throwing out the hearsay rule based solely on the scant
data regarding juror performance, is a proper alternative in the effort
to bring proper evidence into court. If one accepts the arguments
made in favor of the rule-namely, that unrestrained judicial
discretion is an unacceptable substitute for the categorical exclusion
of unreliable hearsay testimony-then the solution to the problem lies
in refining or abolishing the exceptions that rest on questionable
theoretical foundations.
Perhaps most persuasively, critics argue -that in our daily
interactions we often make decisions based on hearsay evidence.89
According to some, the hearsay rule is primarily a remnant of a legal
system in which judges did not trust the "lower-class" jury with the
duty of evaluating problem testimony.90 In contrast, today's jurors
are well-acquainted with hearsay and are aware of its benefits and
difficulties. As Mueller notes,
[c]ritics point out that the hearsay doctrine evolved long
before mass communication and universal public schooling,
and claim modern jurors are sophisticated enough to
evaluate hearsay. In their experiences in life, the argument
runs, jurors acquire an understanding far more discerning
than the simple tests courts apply in excluding hearsay.9'
Why not, therefore, allow jury members to make decisions in the
same way they usually do?
The answer to this criticism lies in exploring the nature of the
relationships in which we make decisions. True, a child may be
rewarded based on the report given by the school teacher, or one
corporation may seek to take over another because of illegally
acquired insider information, or one spouse may divorce the other
spouse based on the rumor of friends. Regardless of the magnitude
of the nonjudicial decision, however, the use of hearsay in court
differs from its use in daily life in three significant respects.
First, when using hearsay in making ordinary decisions, we often
know both the person who made the alleged statement and the person
89. Mueller, supra note 20, at 374; see supra part II.A.3 (noting those who criticize the
rule on the basis of everyday familiarity with hearsay).
90. Weinstein, supra note 53, at 377.
91. Mueller, supra note 20, at 374 (citing Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach
to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1363 (1987)).
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reporting it. This particular knowledge of the individuals involved,
plus the information we have regarding the extent of their knowledge
of the transaction, provides a method for determining the reliability
of the everyday hearsay that is unavailable in the litigation set-
ting-where jurors are required to be disinterested, uninformed, and
unbiased toward the litigants and witnesses.92 The person evaluating
everyday hearsay determines how much weight, if any, to give the
reported statement.93 That person may choose to act on the infor-
mation, to wait until more information is available, or to refrain from
acting. A similar willingness to postpone a decision until all informa-
tion has been gathered and a full inquisition has been made may
explain why hearsay is more freely admitted in the nonjury continen-
tal legal system. Our system simply does not afford the luxury of
time that exists in everyday situations or in the continental tradi-
tion.94
Second, decisions made in the courtroom often have enormous
consequences-even the life or death of the accused. Although
everyday decisions may be quite crucial, the evaluator of the hearsay
is very often the same person who will be affected by any decision
based on the hearsay. The person making an important decision in
the nonlegal setting has, like the jury in the courtroom, the option to
accept, deny, or discount hearsay. But as Mueller points out, the
issues presented at trial are very different from those made in
business and personal life:
Ordinary people have little or no exposure to the forces that
operate during litigation, and the ways these forces affect
statements collected with an eye toward trial, and little or no
familiarity with the most common kinds of litigation-produc-
ing events, from crimes to collisions to toxic or defective
products.95
92. Id. at 383.
93. Swift, supra note 18, at 499.
The crucial point about an Abstract Declarant is that the trier of fact receives
very little information related to the declarant's four testimonial qualities of
perception, memory, sincerity and language use. The trier of fact thus has little
factual basis upon which to apply its own general knowledge and experience
about what kinds of observers are reliable in making those inferences that are
necessary to evaluate the reliability of the particular declarant's statements.
Id.
94. Mueller, supra note 20, at 383 (citing Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay and its
Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425, 444 (1992)).
95. Id at 383-84.
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Similarly, Park notes that the average juror, although familiar with
everyday hearsay, is not accustomed to the game playing that occurs
in litigation:
The problem is exacerbated in situations where one of the
attorneys has had the opportunity to prepare the out-of-
court declarant, as when the proffered statement is an
affidavit prepared by the attorney and signed by the witness.
Here, both sides have "sandpapered" their witnesses, but
only one has had the opportunity to expose the sandpaper-
ing through cross-examination. Jurors may not be familiar
with sophisticated ways of implying something without
actually saying it, or of omitting information in a way that
makes the affidavit literally true but false in its implica-
tions. 6
Furthermore, experience suggests that persons faced with vital
decisions in everyday life may be less likely to rely on hearsay.
Finally, because of the corporate nature of the decision, the
imposition of a penalty by the state, and the possibility of an
unrectifiable mistake, the very integrity of the judicial system may be
at stake when a jury bases its decision on questionable hearsay.
Certainly, major business and personal decisions hinge on everyday
hearsay. But even when the stakes are high in the nonjudicial
context, there is a person, whether corporate executive, spouse, or
parent, who will bear the responsibility for an erroneous decision
based on hearsay. In the litigation setting, however, public trust must
ultimately rest on the integrity and strength of the system in its search
for the truth.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH THE RES GESTAE EXCEPTIONS IN THIS
VISION OF TRUTH FINDING: AN ARGUMENT FOR
ABOLITION OF THE EXCEPTIONS
As previously discussed, improperly screened hearsay carries dual
risks: first, that the jury will not consider that the hearsay may be less
reliable than live testimony and, second, that the public will not have
confidence in a verdict based heavily on "suspect" hearsay testimo-
ny.' To function effectively, therefore, the screening exceptions
must be strong enough to overcome these risks.
96. Park, supra note 28, at 61 n.40.
97. See supra part II.
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A. The Theory Underlying the Res Gestae Exceptions
Typically, the twenty-seven exceptions to the hearsay rule, plus
the residual or "catch-all" exceptions, are justified by either the
supposed trustworthiness of the proffered statement, the statement's
supposed necessity, or both.9" For instance, the previous testimony
of an unavailable declarant, made in court under full and fair cross-
examination, is admissible under Rule 804(b)(1) on the grounds that
the value of the testimony and the inability to procure the live
testimony both weigh against exclusion of the testimony.9  Rule
803(5), in contrast, allows admission of recorded recollections, noting
only the inherent trustworthiness "in a record made while events were
still fresh in mind and accurately reflecting them."'"
The res gestae exceptions are based in the trustworthiness
element of the exception justifications. Recalling that the possibility
of fabrication, memory loss, or poor communication by the witness
before the jury are major justifications for the exclusionary rule,'
it is not surprising that many written materials are excepted."2
Written materials simply are not susceptible to unintentional
alterations by the witness, and intentional manipulation of such
material is very difficult. The same cannot be said for verbal
statements, particularly res gestae hearsay, which is always verbal and
often made under frantic conditions or attenuated circumstances.
Another supposed guarantor of trustworthiness, however, is the
"transactional" nature of particular statements. Such statements,
which include the res gestae exceptions, are thought by some to
possess a higher degree of reliability than non-transactional statements
because they surround the event in question. 3  For instance, the
98. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 20, at 370 n.9; Park, supra note 28, at 69-70.
99. This exception also recognizes the procedural safeguards employed in the previous
trial, and therefore contains overtones of the trustworthiness exception. FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
100. FED. R. EvID. 803(5) advisory committee's note. The trustworthiness concern is
also observed in other exceptions based on written evidence, such as commercial
publications (803(17)), treatises (803(18)), or regularly kept business records (803(6)).
101. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
102. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803. Fourteen of the 24 exceptions to the hearsay rule
involve writings, records, or certificates. Id.
103. Indeed, Mueller goes so far as to guggest that "it seems at least plausible to admit
statements closely associated with the events in litigation-what we used to call 'res gestae'
and Park now calls 'transactional statements.'" Mueller, supra note 20, at 389 (footnote
omitted). "'Flhe principle utility of the exception is in exposing juries to the parties'
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statement of the store manager in our shoplifting hypothetical clearly
demonstrates an excited utterance due to the supposed stress under
which it was made. Similarly, an unidentified person at the scene of
an accident might make a contemporaneous statement that appears
to be quite probative, and although the statement is not made "under
pressure," it is nonetheless deemed an impression of the declarant's
present sense and part of the res gestae." In theory, this intimate
connection between event and statement reduces the likelihood of
fabrication, forgetfulness, or misinterpretation. Park states the
argument as follows: "the witness does not have freedom to choose
a convenient time and place to hear a fictional declarant or statement,
and therefore the witness's fabrication might be exposed by other
witnesses or by circumstantial evidence."1 5 Because transactional
statements are closely related to the subject of the litigation, they are
thought to possess intrinsically high probative value.
The exceptions for excited utterance, present sense impression,
and state of mind are based on a peculiar belief that contemporaneity,
excitement, or a combination of the two lend an extra element of
trustworthiness to the hearsay evidence." Specifically, the excited
utterance exception is based on a belief that a statement made under
stress or excitement, at the very moment of the event, carries a high
degree of trustworthiness."° In contrast, the exceptions for present
sense impression and state of mind depend solely on the absence of
sufficient time for the declarant to engage in reflective thought.1"
B. Contemporaneity as Insurer Against Fabrication
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) instructs that the hearsay rule
does not exclude "[a] statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
reactions to events leading to suit .... "" Id. at 389 n.64 (emphasis added); see also Park,
supra note 28, at 75 (noting that the res gestae exceptions make more sense because they
are connected to transactional statements).
104. See, e.g., Skelly Beauty Academy, Inc. v. Columbia Gas 58597-58600, 1991 Ohio
App. LEXIS 4235, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. August 29, 1991) (finding reporter's testimony
as to an unidentified firefighter's statements regarding the source of the fire admitted
under the present sense impression exception).
105. Park, supra note 28, at 76.
106. See Mueller, supra note 20, at 371.
107. Id. (stating that excited utterances are admitted because "we think that people
reacting suddenly to an event cannot lie").
108. See 11 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 803(1)[31 (2d
ed. 1995).
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condition, or immediately thereafter."'" This exception for present
sense impression generally involves an out-of-court statement
describing an unexciting event."" The exception arises from the
supposed reliability of a declarant's statement made contemporane-
ously with the event described.'' Although the advisory committee
note to 803(1) states that a "slight [time] lapse is allowable," the note
makes it clear "that substantial contemporaneity of event and
statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepre-
sentation.""'  Contemporaneity is the key because "an impression
made in response to any event is considered to be 'instinctive, rather
than deliberative-in short, the reflex product of immediate sensual
impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action.' "
Likewise, the determination of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3)
that the hearsay rule does not exclude "[a] statement of the declar-
ant's then existing state of mind, emotion, [or] sensation" finds its
roots in the contemporaneity requirement." 4  In addition to the
requirement that the statement be contemporaneous, thus insuring no
chance for reflection before the statement is made, 803(3) requires
that the state of mind of the declarant "be a relevant issue in the
case.""' 5 This additional requirement would appear to be nothing
more than a restatement of the already applicable relevance require-
ment found in Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.
The contemporaneity justification for the present sense impres-
sion and state of mind exceptions centers on the belief that fabrication
or misinterpretation is minimal when the declarant makes the
statement with little or no time lapse between the underlying event
and the statement."6 This assumption is questionable at best, and
109. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
110. See MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 271, at 211; 11 MOORE ET AL., supra note 108,
§ 803(1)[3].
111. See MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 271, at 211; 11 MOORE ET AL., supra note 108,
§ 803(1)[3].
112. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee's note.
113. 11 MOORE ET AL, supra note 108, § 803(1)[11 (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Res
Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REv. 911 (1937)).
114. FED. R. EVID. 803(3); United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985,991 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding that the court must evaluate three factors: contemporaneity, opportunity for
reflection, and relevance).
115. Prather v. Prather, 650 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1981).
116. MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 271, at 211 (explaining that the exception for
present sense impression finds its origin in Professor Thayer's work, and was a
contradiction of Wigmore's insistence that excitement guaranteed reliability).
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the fact that only the supposed trustworthiness, and, therefore, the
reliability of such statements prevents their exclusion exposes a major
flaw in the exception. According to Professor Tribe:
The closeness in time of statement to perception reduces
memory problems to the de minimis level, and for a number
of reasons, including the fact that what one perceives as his
physical or mental sensations are his sensations, there is
ordinarily no possibility of erroneous perception. But the
*.. infirmities of ambiguity and insincerity remain.'17
Despite the nexus between event and statement, there appears to be
ample opportunity under the present sense impression exception for
deliberate or accidental misstatement by the declarant. In State v.
Smith"8 an assailant robbed the victim and locked him in the back
of a truck."9 After exiting the vehicle, the victim received a note
from an unidentified woman who claimed she witnessed the rob-
bery.120 The note bore a license plate number that the police later
used to apprehend the defendant.' Responding to defense objec-
tions that the note was inadmissible hearsay because it could have
been inaccurate or deliberately contrived by the woman, the court
affirmed the trial court's admission of the evidence under the present
sense impression exception, stating:
The fact that the declaration is made contemporaneously
with the event being described adds reliability in that there
is no danger of a defective memory rendering the declara-
tion unreliable. Also, in the case of verbal declarations, the
declaration will be made in the hearing of the person who
later relates the declaration. Therefore, this person will
possibly have had an opportunity to observe the event
himself and thus provide a check on the accuracy of the
declarant's observation. Even where the declaration is
nonverbal, however, the fact that the statement is made
contemporaneously with the act or immediately thereafter
implies reliability since the declarant is unlikely to have had
117. Tribe, supra note 22, at 965.
118. 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973).
119. Id. at 241-42.
120. Id. at 242.
121. Id.
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an opportunity to form a purpose to mistake his observa-
tions.'22
In contrast with his support of the excited utterance exception,
Wigmore opposed the exception for present sense impression on the
grounds that such exceptions possess no "circumstantial guarantee of
sincerity (whether there was time to concoct a story, whether the
excitement of the moment-dominated), and the decision turns merely
upon the question whether the declaration can be regarded as 'a part
of the transaction,' or 'a part of the res gestae.' ,,a
Indeed, the only safeguard that exists to prevent such errors of
admission into evidence is the length of time between the perceived
event and the statement. According to McCormick, "[w]hile principle
might seem to call for a limitation to exact contemporaneity, some
allowance must be made for the time needed for translating observa-
tion into speech. Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether sufficient
time elapsed to have permitted reflective thought."' 4 The arbitrari-
ness that necessarily accompanies such an inquiry is evidenced in case
law.' Is a time lapse of between fifteen and forty-five minutes too
long to warrant admission of the statement under the exception? One
litigant's guess would appear to be as good as another's.
Furthermore, as an initial justification for exceptions based solely
on contemporaneity-the existence of corroborating testimony-was
lost in the codification of the Federal Rules. The seminal case in the
development of the exception' for present sense impression was
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis,'26 In Houston the driver of an
automobile, occupied by two passengers, observed that the occupants
of another car "must have been drunk" and that they were travelling
at a high rate of speed. 7 Waltz has noted that besides the contem-
poraneous nature of the statement, an additional guarantor of
trustworthiness existed in the corroboration by the passengers, who
were present at the time and observed the event while hearing the
122. Id. at 245. Alternatively, the court ruled that the note could have been an "excited
utterance." Id. at 244-45.
123. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1757(2), at 169.
124. MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 271, at 214.
125. Compare United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding as
much as twenty-three minute lapse acceptable) rev'd on other grounds, United States v.
Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1264 (7th Cir. 1991) with Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., 578 F.2d
422, 426 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding a fifteen minute lapse was unacceptable).
126. 161 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1942).
127. Id at 476.
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statement.'" McCormick supports Waltz's belief that corroboration
of a present sense impression should be an additional requirement of
any absolute exception to the hearsay rule:
[T]he limitation of the exception in terms of time and
subject matter usually insures that the witness who reports
the making of the statement will have himself perceived the
event or at least observed circumstances strongly'suggesting
it. This ... [is] an added assurance of accuracy, but a
justification for admission is not the same as a requirement
for admission.'29
The advent of the 911 call and the subsequent technological
dismantling of McCormick's belief in the automatic assurance of
witness's corroboration convinced the New York Court of Appeals to
recognize the present sense impression exception for the first time in
that court's distinguished history and institute a corroboration
requirement for all statements proffered under the exception. ° In
People v. Brown"', a caller identified only by a first name reported
a restaurant burglary in progress, and gave a description and location
of the alleged burglars."3 2 Upon arrival at the scene, the police
apprehended two suspects who matched the description given by the
caller, and who, as the caller had described, were attempting to climb
onto the roof of the restaurant. 133  According to the court, "[tihat
the circumstances and events at the. scene were still very much as
described by [the caller] corroborates, what seems evident from the
calls themselves-that [the caller's] reports were spontaneous and
128. Waltz, supra note 81, at 24.
129. MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 271, at 215. Even McCormick's assumption is
refuted in an example given by Waltz, where the witness testified, "[w]hen I went into the
living room my husband told me, 'Clyde Bushmat, whose voice I'd recognize anywhere,
called me on the telephone just seconds ago and offered me a bribe."' Waltz, supra note
81, at 24. Waltz notes that
[t]he witness on the stand did not hear either end of the supposed telephone
conversation.' Consequently, she provides no check on the accuracy of her
husband's assertion that he had in fact received a telephone call. Likewise, she
provides no check on the accuracy of her husband's assertion that the voice on
the other end of the line was Clyde Bushmat's and that the words Bushmat
spoke added up to a bribe offer.
Id.
130. People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 373 (N.Y. 1993).
131. Id.
132. 1& at 371.
133. Id.
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made contemporaneously with the events described."'" The Brown
decision is a step forward in hearsay law, for it recognizes the
possibility of fabrication in the present sense impression exception and
adds a measure of reliability not found in the Federal Rules or in
state evidentiary rules that justify the exception solely on the basis of
contemporaneity.
C. Excitement as a Guarantor of Trustworthiness
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), the hearsay rule does
not exclude "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition."'35  McCormick claims "the ultimate
question is whether the statement was the result of reflective thought
or whether it was rather a spontaneous reaction to the exciting
event."' 36  The exception for excited utterance may be traced
directly to Wigmore's belief "that in the stress of nervous excitement
the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become
the unreflecting and sincere expression of one's actual impressions
and belief"' 37 Wigmore insisted that "[t]he utterance ... must be
... 'generated by an excited feeling which extends without let or
break-down from the moment of the event [it] illustrate[s].' "138
Although Wigmore may have had good reason to fear unbridled judi-
cial discretion, one may wonder why it is more desirable for judges to
bury their heads in the sand and hide behind the questionable
rationale of the excited utterance exception.
Indeed, judicial applications of the exception often appear to
overlook the possibility that a traumatic event may not only still
reflective thought, but may also hinder rational thought and cognitive
functioning. 39  In People v. Miklejohn"'4 a New York appellate
court reversed the conviction of a murder suspect because the trial
court failed to admit evidence of the excited utterance of the victim,
who had been a long-time acquaintance of the defendant. 4' The
134. Id. at 374.
135. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
136. MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 272, at 218.
137. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1749.
138. Id. (citations omitted).
139. Mortimer J. Adler et al., Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 432, 437 (1928).
140. 585 N.Y.S.2d 454 (App. Div. 1992).
141. Id. at 455-56.
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defendant sought to introduce the victim's alleged statement, in which
the victim told police that "he did not know the perpetrator and did
not know if he could identify him."142 The victim gave the state-
ment only after questioning by the police and under the following
conditions:
[T]he victim [was] lying face up on the sidewalk. There was
a large puddle of blood around the head area. The victim
was still conscious, but appeared dazed and confused, and
was bleeding very heavily. He was- suffering from what
proved to be a fatal bullet wound to the head and brain. 43
Despite the victim's severe head injury and apparent lack of cognitive
faculties, the court ruled that the trial court erred in excluding the
statement.144 The court reasoned that "[i]n view of testimony
indicating that the victim had been beaten and shot shortly before the
police arrived, he was unlikely'to have made the statements in
question 'under the impetus of studied reflection."' 145  Similarly,
another decision of the New York Supreme Court demonstrates the
judicial propensity to overlook the possible cognitive difficulties
caused by severe trauma and focuses only on the "reflective thought"
rationale behind the rule:
We find unpersuasive the defendant's challenge... regard-
ing the complainant's identification of the defendant as her
assailant shortly after the shooting. The testimony was
properly admitted as an excited utterance, inasmuch as the
record demonstrates that the complainant was under the
stress of having suffered serious multiple gunshot wounds
only minutes before making the statement, that she was
bleeding heavily and was experiencing a great deal of pain,
and that her statement was not the product of deliberation
or reflection) 46
Furthermore, the time lapse under excited utterance may be
longer than that allowed under present sense impression and state of
mind so long as the excitement of the event is deemed to have
continued. 47 Again, in many of these cases, the possible cognitive
142. Id. at 455.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 455-56.
145. Id. at 456 (citations omitted).
146. People v. Hood, 598 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (App. Div. 1993).
147. MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 272, at 218-19.
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deficiencies brought about by the trauma are not considered, nor are
convincing reasons given to support the determination that the
declarant has not begun to reflect on the traumatic event. 14 In
People v. Evans49 the New York Appellate Court admitted the
victim's identification of the defendant as an "excited utterance."'5
According to the court, the "testimony... established that the victim
was bleeding, breathingheavily,,perspiring, weak, dizzy, and express-
ing a desire to go to the hospital" and
[a]lthough the victim's statement to the police officer was
made approximately 30 minutes [after being shot in the
stomach], the surrounding circumstances justify the conclu-
sion that the statement was not made under the impetus of
studied reflection and that the victim was still under the
continuing stress and excitement of the shooting.'
As with the present sense impression and state of mind excep-
tions, judges inconsistently apply the excited utterance exception.'
For instance, the court in State v. Stafford'53 admitted statements
that the declarant had made some fourteen hours after the exciting
event.' 54 In Alabama Power Co. v. Ray,'55 however, an accident
148. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 592 N.Y.S.2d 43,43 (App. Div. 1993); People v. Evans,
583 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (App. Div. 1992).
149. 583 N.Y.S.2d 510.
150. Evans, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
151. Id.; see also Garcia, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (the victim made the statement at the
hospital while he was in pain and feared dying).
We reject defendant's contention that [the victim's] statement to his mother at
the hospital identifying defendant as the assailant was improperly admitted as an
excited utterance, several witnesses having testified to [the victim's] expression
of pain and fear of dying, and the circumstances otherwise "reasonably
justify[ing] the conclusion that the remarks were not made under the impetus of
studied reflection." A different result is not required simply because the
utterance was made some 45 minutes after the knife attack in response to a
question put to [the victim] by his mother.
Garcia, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 43-44 (citation omitted) (third alteration in original).
Lempert and Saltzburg note that "there are cases where time is, in effect, suspended.
Courts have admitted statements made by individuals immediately upon waking from
comas, hours or even days after the event described, apparently on the theory that while
the patient was unconscious the excitement did not abate." LEMPERT & SALTZBURG,
supra note 30, at 418.
152. State v. Stafford, 23 N.W.2d 832, 835 (Iowa 1946); Alabama Power Co. v. Ray, 32
So. 2d 219,221 (Ala. 1947); Handel v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 297 N.Y.S. 216,216
(App. Div. 1937).
153. 23 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1946).
154. Id. at 835-36.
155. 32 So. 2d 219 (Ala. 1947).
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victim's statement, made just five minutes after the incident, was
deemed inadmissible." 6 And in the well-known case of Handel v.
New York Rapid Transit Corp., over a strong dissent based on res
gestae principles, the Supreme Court of New York refused to allow
testimony recounting the screams of the victim, "Save me. Help
me-why did that conductor close the door on me."' 7 According
to the court, the statement -"was narrative of a past event and within
the hearsay rule."'58
The most startling example of an arbitrary application of the
exception may be People v. Seymour,'5 9 in which the Supreme Court
of New York determined that the statements of the seventy-nine-year-
old victim, identifying the defendant, were partially admissible and
partially inadmissible under the exception for "excited utterance."'' "
In Seymour the wounded victim lay in his apartment for forty-eight
hours following the attack, drifting in and out of consciousness, and
made his first utterance an hour and twenty minutes after being
discovered in his apartment.161 The court admitted this first state-
ment, noting that because of "the substantial distractions which
accompanied the administration of medical care ... decedent could
not have concentrated sufficiently to fabricate an accusation."'62
The court also reasoned that the physical trauma insured that the
victim "had not yet had an opportunity for 'studied reflection.' ,,6
However, the court refused to admit the victim's additional statements
made twenty minutes after further emergency treatment, in which the
victim identified the defendant by name." 4 The court determined
that the second utterance, unlike the first, was not a "spontaneous
declaration."' 6  Seymour demonstratds how the excited utterance
exception fosters a propensity for judicial mind reading. Perhaps
equally disturbing is a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
which appears to remove excited utterances from the realm of human
creation:
156. Id. at 221.
157. 297 N.Y.S. at 217.
158. Id.
159. 588 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1992).
160. Id. at 553-54.
161. Id. at 552.
162. Id. at 555.
163. Id. at 554.
164. Id. at 554-55.
165. Id at 554.
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An excited utterance is the event speaking and not the
speaker. It is an exception to the hearsay rule, carved from
human experience, which teaches that an unreflected [sic],
spontaneous utterance made under the impact of a shocking,
unexpected emotion, precipitated by a traumatic event,
renders the speaker the medium and not the message.'
66
These cases demonstrate that the vast differences in judicial applica-
tion of the exception leave litigants guessing as to what potentially
decisive testimony will be admitted and excluded at trial.
Wigmore apparently ignored or overlooked the glaring danger
that excitement, impulse, fear, or similar exigencies may lead to
misstatement by the declarant. Commentators, however, have not
been so lax in their evaluation of the exception. Indeed, it is virtually
impossible to find a modern commentator who accepts Wigmore's
assumptions regarding the effect of highly exciting events on a
declarant. Although Lempert and Saltzburg agree with Wigmore's
belief that excitement may prevent self-serving statements, they argue,
"excitement tends to distort perception and may cloud memory.
There is reason to believe that excited utterances are, on balance, less
reliable than much of the hearsay we refuse to admit."'67 This may
be especially true when the declarant observes a startling, unfamiliar
event.'6 Park states that "[t]he excited utterance exception ... can
hardly be defended [on the ground of declarant reliability]-indeed,
the better view seems to be that excited utterances are less reliable
than unexcited ones."'169 Mueller asks rhetorically, "Who would tell
a daughter to sort out second-hand statements by applying the tests
embedded in the hearsay exceptions-'trust what you're told an
excited man said,' for example, because 'excited men don't lie'?'
170
And according to Professors Hutchins and Slesinger:
166. Commonwealth v. Zukauskas, 462 A.2d 236, 237 (Pa. 1983).
167. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 30, at 417.
168. 1. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present
Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 28,
169. Park, supra note 28, at 75. Park goes on to suggest that the transactional nature
of res gestae statements work somewhat like relation back of amendments, in that the
opponent is not surprised by the easily discoverable hearsay statement. Id. While one
could question Park's assumption, it is even more curious that he believes that this feature
makes the res gestae exceptions "easy to accept even if they lack indicia of reliability."
Id. Why, one might ask, would we, under any circumstances, want unreliable evidence
presented to the trier of fact?
170. Mueller, supra note 20, at 375.
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What the emotion gains by way of overcoming the desire to
lie, it loses by impairing the declarant's power of observa-
tion. On the one hand, if reflective self-interest has not had
a chance to operate because of emotional stress, then the
statement should be excluded because of the probable
inaccuracy of observation. On the other, if little emotion is
involved, clearly a very short time is sufficient to allow
reflective self-interest to assume fullsway. On that basis
there would seem to be no reason for this hearsay exception.
In fact, the emphasis should be all the other way. On
psychological grounds, the rule might very well read:
Hearsay is inadmissible, especially (not except) if it be a
spontaneous exclamation.'71
Empirical evidence, as well as common sense, support these
suspicions of Wigmore's premise. For instance, according to a recent
psychological study exploring the ways in which cognitive faculties are
affected by various stress-producing situations,
[r]esearch evidence suggests that a deterioration in the
quality of the decision-making process is observed during
stress. Experimentally manipulated stressors such as
perceived threat, time pressure, and noise, as well as more
naturally occurring life-event stressors are associated with a
low quality decision-making process. These changes include
decreased ability to differentiate and integrate information
in the decision-making process [and] greater emphasis on
negative evidence. 72
Similarly, another group of researchers studying the way in which
humans process information, determined that as the "input load" of
information is increased, "we witness a decline in perception and an
increase or maintenance in decision-making structure."'7 3  In a
highly stressful situation, the ability to make quick, efficient decisions
171. Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432,439 (1928). Curiously, Hutchins and Slesinger conclude
that both the exception for "excited utterance" and present sense impression should be
retained. Id.
172. Yavin Shaham et al., Stability/Instability of Cognitive Strategies Across Tasks
Determine Whether Stress Will Affect Judgmental Processes, 22 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 691,
694 (1992) (citations omitted).
173. HAROLD M. SCHRODER ET AL., HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING:
INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS FUNCTIONING IN COMPLEX SOCIAL SITUATIONS 99 (1967).
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may be dependent on "more and more restricted perception.
174
Another study indicates that exposure to traumatic events may foster
selective memory and encourage the victim to find any reasonable
explanation for the trauma.
Traumatic stressors appear to evoke certain cognitive mecha-
nisms .... In the process, new and unfamiliar information
is excluded. Alternatively, one might say that the past is
seen in the present and the unique and new aspects of the
present are not responded to. Additionally, there appears
to be a loss of flexibility of cognition and perception....
... It does appear that in the absence of meaning or
when the "facts do not fit," individuals and groups attempt
to develop a meaning for the events that are occurring.' 75
An article by Daniel Stewart gives a thorough account of much
of the psychological data that refutes historical assumptions about the
guarantors of accuracy and perception. 76 In addition to the prob-
lems of witness's "stereotypes"' and poor recollection of "verbal
descriptions,"'7" Stewart notes:
[n]umerous other factors influence perception and memory.
The mental "set" or expectation of an individual will tend to
focus attention on particular objects to the exclusion of
others. Favorable material is more readily remembered than
unfavorable. Excitement, a factor evidence law relied upon
as a warrant for trustworthiness, produces a significant
degree of error, sometimes of the most bizarre type.
Repression of memories of acts or thoughts strongly incon-
sistent with a person's self-concept may transpose reality
diametrically .... .7
Indeed, stressful events are responsible for problems of percep-
tion, cognition, and performance at a variety of levels and in virtually
every situation-from a decline in major league batting averages in
pressure situations,8 ° to the ability of police officers to perform
174. Id
175. Robert J. Ursano & Carol S. Fullerton, Cognitive and Behavioral Responses to
Trauma, 20 J. App. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1766, 1772 (1990).
176. Stewart, supra note 168, at 19-29.
177. Id. at 17.
178. Id. at 19.
179. Id. (citations omitted).
180. Mark H. Davis & Jonathan C. Harvey, Declines in Major League Batting
Performance as a Function of Game Pressure: A Drive Theory Analysis, 22 J. APP. Soc.
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adequately in high-stress training,' to the way in which students
cope with exam pressure."u Scanning the wealth of information
describing how stressful, traumatic events negatively affect human
functioning, it is disturbing to discover that judges regularly rely upon
the excited utterance exception for no better reason than its "firm
entrenchment" in the law of evidence. 3
Curiously, Wigmore's belief in the reliability of "excited
utterances" led to its inclusion in the class of exceptions which are
admissible despite the declarant's availability to testify at trial." In
other words, to accept Wigmore's position, one must be convinced
that the declarant's excited statement is more trustworthy than her
live recollection of the event at trial." Professor Tribe emphasizes:
PSYCHOL. 714 (1992).
181. John M. Violanti, Coping Strategies Among Police Recruits in a High-Stress
Training Environment, 132 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 717 (1992).
182. Robert F. Scherer & Philip M. Drumheller, Jr., Consistency in Cognitive Appraisal
of a Stressful Event Over Time, 132 J. SoC. PSYCHOL 553 (1992). Scherer and Drumheller
found that "the process of evaluating a stressful event may change over the duration of
the event." Id. at 554 (citation omitted). This finding appears to especially challenge the
judicial application of the "excited utterance" exception when even a shorter amount of
time has passed between the exciting event and the utterance.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 791F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1986); Price v. Indiana, 591
N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1992); Holmes v. State, 480 N.E.2d 916 (Ind. 1985); Chapman v.
Maryland, 628 A.2d 676 (Md. 1993).
The ease with which courts accept the excited utterance exception is especially
disturbing in the context of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause where the
Supreme Court recently stated that "[o]ur precedents have recognized that statements
admitted under a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception are so trustworthy that adversarial
testing would add little to their reliability." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21 (1990).
In the same opinion the Court confirmed that the exception for excited utterances is
"firmly rooted":
[I]f the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances
that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay
rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial. The basis for the "excited
utterance" exception, for example, is that such statements are given under
circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or
confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and
that cross-examination would be superfluous.
Id. at 820.
184. The exceptions to the hearsay rule are officially grouped into two classifications:
those exceptions where the declarant is unavailable and those where the declarant's
unavailability is immaterial. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803 (unavailability immaterial); FED.
R. EVID. 804 (declarant unavailable).
185. In addition to its unquestioning reliance on the historical rationale behind the
"excited utterance" exception, the Wright Court stressed the unimportance of cross-
examination when a court admits such hearsay. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821. The Court's
assertion that the "excited utterance" exception renders cross-examination "of marginal
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[Tihe absence of an unavailability requirement for excited
utterances is based on the view that an excited utterance
about an event is likely to be more "reliable" than in-court
testimony about the same event. But [Tribe's theory]
suggests that this explanation does not suffice, for an excited
utterance might suffer from severe infirmities of ambiguity
which cross-examination could usefully reduce.'86
Thus, a proponent's ability to proffer such hearsay evidence when the
declarant could otherwise testify is especially devastating when
coupled with the opponent's inability to cross-examine the declarant.
utility" or "superfluous" provided rather enigmatic support for the exception's continued
inclusion in the "unavailability immaterial" category. Id. at 820. Because, however, the
defendant in Wright conceded that the declarant was unavailable, the Court did not
explicitly decide whether its rule announced in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), that
the Confrontation Clause required that a declarant be available to testify at trial or be
clearly unavailable before reliable hearsay could constitutionally be admitted, would be
relaxed in the case of a "firmly rooted" exception. Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-21; see United
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (holding that Roberts' unavailability requirement was
not applicable to co-conspirator statements).
Thus, some commentators continued to question whether adherence to the "firmly
rooted" excited utterance exception would pass constitutional muster in a case where the
declarant was available, yet the prosecution did not produce the declarant at trial. See,
e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Child-Witness Statements and the Right to Confrontation, N.Y. L.J.,
July 13, 1990, at 3. "After Wright, a strong argument can be made that the prosecution
must produce all available hearsay declarants--other than co-conspirators, who are
specifically controlled by Inadi-unless cross-examination would be of little utility to the
defendant in the specific case." Id. at 33. All speculation was put to rest by the Court's
decision in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), which resoundingly approved the
exception for excited utterances.
T]he evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding spontane-
ous declarations.., is that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts
that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness. But those same
factors that contribute to the statements' reliability cannot be recaptured even
by later in-court testimony. A statement that has been offered in a moment of
excitement-without the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one's
exclamation-may justifiably carry more weight with a trier of fact than a similar
statement offered in the relative calm of the courtroom ....
... [W]here proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come
within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause
is satisfied.
Id. at 355-56 (footnote omitted). Implicitly, the Court's holding applies to all other "firmly
rooted" exceptions. In a footnote, the Court made clear that its definition of "firmly
rooted" hinges on the exception's historical place in the hearsay schema and its continued
widespread use and acceptance-not on the defensibility of the exception's theoretical
underpinnings. Id. at 355 n.8. Under this definition, the lengthy tenure and almost
universal acceptance of the exceptions for present sense impression and state of mind
would make them likely candidates for inclusion in the "firmly rooted" category. See
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987).
186. Tribe, supra note 22, at 969.
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The assertion that the hearsay exceptions provide only a baseline
level of reliability in the absence of cross-examination'17 may appear
to support the transfer of the res gestae exceptions into the "declarant
unavailable" category."8  Although this strategy might rectify the
immediate inequity, the infirmities that permeate the exceptions
would remain when a party seeks to admit the res gestae statements
of an unavailable or deceased declarant.89 To emphasize this point,
recall that courts admit res gestae statements even when the defen-
dant is available because the statements supposedly possess an extra
measure of reliability and probative force that cannot be duplicated
by the declarant's direct testimony. 9 Therefore, to move the res
gestae exceptions into the "declarant unavailable" category would
effectively concede the weaknesses of the theoretical underpinnings
of the exceptions and would place the law in the untenable position
of sanctioning the occasional admission of unreliable evidence.
It appears the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of
Evidence did not disregard numerous empirical data and common-
sense objections to the excited utterance exception.19 Instead of
heeding the warnings, however, the committee chose to incorporate
Wigmore's largely unsubstantiated exception by making an interesting
deduction."9 To paraphrase the committee: if so many courts have
followed the rule, it must be good. 93 It is quite disturbing that the
committee's questionable justification, already based on Wigmore's
questionable rationale, anchors a body of law that dictates what
evidence is admitted in our federal courts, and, by inference, in many
state courts.
187. See supra part II.C.1.
188. It should be noted that arguing for the shift of the res gestae exceptions into the
"declarant unavailable" category does not necessarily implicate an argument for abolition
of the entire "unavailability immaterial" category. Hearsay based on written records, for
instance, may be truly more probative than the live testimony of the recording party.
189. Stewart argues that "[w]henever hearsay testimony raises substantial questions of
the accuracy of perception and memory of the hearsay declarant, the law should require
the declarant to testify and should admit his hearsay declarations only if he is unavailable."
Stewart, supra note 168, at 3.
190. See White, 502 U.S. at 356.
191. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee's note.
192. Id.
193. The actual explanation of the advisory committee was that "[w]hile the theory of
[the excited utterance exception] has been criticized on the ground that excitement impairs
accuracy of observation as well as eliminating conscious fabrication,.., it finds support
in cases without number." See Park, supra note 28, at 75 n.98 (quoting FED. R. EVID.
803(2) advisory committee's notes).
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As one commentator noted during the debate over the Federal
Rules, the res gestae exceptions contain virtually no effective
safeguards against fabrication; they fail to differentiate between
interested and disinterested witnesses; they are ineffective even when
accompanied by cross-examination of the witness because the witness
need only "state what he remembers or 'thinks' the declarant said"
and there is no corroboration requirement.'94 The fallacy of "reflec-
tive thought" as an objective measurement and the judicial inability
to consistently apply doctrines based on such questionable theoretical
foundations make abolition of the exceptions for excited utterance,
present sense impression, and state of mind a logical step in refining
an otherwise efficacious evidence system.
V. VIABLE RES GESTAE HEARSAY: ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES
FOR ADMISSION?
A. Probative Value Versus Questionable Reliability
One might argue that abolishing the res gestae exceptions carries
the risk that information will be withheld from the jury-information
that, if reliable, could be extremely probative in the search for truth.
The test essentially balances the risk of an unjust verdict based on
unreliable hearsay against the possibility that the proffered evidence
is reliable and probative. The questionable theoretical justifications
that suggest the veracity of statements made under stress, excitement,
or during the course of a transaction-not to mention the possibility
of outright fabrication by the witness-and the suspect accuracy that
results, must always outweigh the danger that probative information
will be excluded.
If the excluded statement would recount evidence that is
available from other sources, then the proponent of the evidence must
ensure that such reliable sources or witnesses are brought before the
trier of fact for consideration. Absent this corroborating evidence, the
exclusion of the res gestae hearsay is all the more warranted. If no
other sources are available, and if the sound hurdles provided by one
of the other exceptions cannot establish the reliability of the proffered
hearsay, the probative value of the evidence should be disregarded
and the evidence excluded. In other words, evidence based solely on
the res gestae exceptions should never be admitted. In light of this
194. Note, Rule 804(b) (2) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Step Too Far?,
4 VAL. U. L. REV. 327, 342 (1970).
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determination, is there a place for the admission of res gestae hearsay
in the courtroom?
B. The "Catch-All" Exceptions: A Possible Avenue of Admission
Abolishing the res gestae exceptions does not absolutely foreclose
the possibility that such hearsay will be admitted. The Federal Rules
of Evidence contain provisions allowing admission of otherwise
inadmissible hearsay when certain guarantors of reliability are
present."5 Such statements are "not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but hav[e] equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness."196
These residual exceptions, codified in Rule 803(24), declarant
unavailability immaterial; and Rule 804(b)(5), unavailability required;
are specifically designed for situations where proffered evidence
"demonstrate[s] a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically
stated exceptions."''  As enacted, they would provide judges with
the limited discretion necessary to admit res gestae hearsay only when
it overcomes the infirmities discussed in preceding sections of this
Article.
The residual exceptions admonish judges to act with care when
admitting evidence thereunder.9 The Advisory Committee stated
that these exceptions "do not contemplate an unfettered exercise of
judicial discretion." '  This is an admonition that judges are well-
advised to follow in the case of res gestae statements. Significantly,
the current codified exceptions for excited utterance, present sense
impression, and state of mind contain no such suggestion of judicial
restraint, and some judges have been quick to admit testimony under
their questionable auspices.
2°°
In addition, both residual exceptions require that the proffered
statement be a "material fact."2 1 As Lempert and Saltzburg note,
this requirement has little substantive effect, because "[i]f a statement
195. Id. at 332-33.
196. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(b)(5).
197. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note.
198. LEMPERT & SALZBURG, supra note 30, at 502 (citing SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974)).
199. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note.
200. See generally supra part III (discussing the problems presented by broad judicial
discretion).
201. FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(A) & 804(b)(5)(A).
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is not material, it is not admissible under any hearsay exception."
2M
But as a check on the system, the requirement should help to
underscore the judge's duty to use extreme caution in evaluating the
viability of such evidence. Likewise, the requirement "that the
purposes of the rules and the interests of justice be served" simply
underscores the cautionary function. °3 The residual exceptions also
contain a notice provision, not found in the res gestae exceptions.
204
This requirement ensures that an opponent is not caught off-guard by
the admission of what would usually be inadmissible hearsay.
2 5
This additional requirement would be an improvement over current
res gestae admission practices, in which, as shown, judges often apply
the exceptions arbitrarily, giving the litigants little notice of what will
be admitted and excluded.
The final safeguard employed by the residual exceptions also
directly addresses a problem associated with the res gestae exceptions.
Under both Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5), the proffered statement
must be "more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can secure through reasonable
efforts."2' Although Rule 803(24) technically falls within the
unavailability immaterial category, an available declarant with
testimony more probative than the proffered hearsay must testify or
the evidence will never come before the fact-finder; a declarant's
valuable testimony cannot be withheld while less probative hearsay is
admitted under the residual exception.2' Therefore, unlike res
gestae statements, which are included in the unavailability immaterial
category and are often admitted despite the existence of better live
testimony, Rule 803(24) refuses to allow a party to proffer question-
able hearsay while a declarant with superior direct testimony waits in
the wings.21 Similarly, when the declarant is unavailable, Rule
202. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 30, at 503.
203. Id.
204. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(b)(5).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986); FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(B).
208. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394; FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(B). As discussed previously, supra
notes 182 and 184, the Confrontation Clause figures prominently in the admission of
hearsay in criminal prosecutions. Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the res
gestae exceptions appear to be "firmly-rooted exceptions," and are thus admissible,
regardless of the declarant's availability, because of the supposed inherent trustworthiness
that permeates an exception cloaked with the "firmly-rooted" designation. Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990).
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804(b)(5) demands that the proffered utterances, excited or otherwise,
of the out-of-court declarant be better than any other evidence
offered on the point. This, of course, is a requirement not found in
the current res gestae scheme, where the hearsay is admitted
regardless of the existence of more probative evidence so long as the
Two observations bear mention. First, the exclusion of res gestae statements from the
"firmly-rooted" exception category would follow, per se, the abolition of res gestae
statements as categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule-after all, they would no longer
be exceptions. Yet, this removal from the "firmly-rooted" category would have nothing
to do with the theoretical dismantling of the res gestae exceptions that precipitated their
abolition because the Court defines an exception as "firmly-rooted," not because it makes
theoretical sense, but because it enjoys longevity and is widely accepted by the courts; a
viable theoretical underpinning has little or nothing to do with the designation. See
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. at 183; supra notes 182 and 184 and accompanying
text. Thus, if offered under one of the residual exceptions, a res gestae statement would
have to overcome the same Confrontation Clause hurdles as any other rootless or poorly-
rooted exception. In other words, after abolition of the res gestae exceptions, a court
could not simply use a boot strap argument to circumvent the Confrontation Clause and
admit an excited utterance under a residual exception because it was theoretically "firmly-
rooted."
Second, if the res gestae exceptions are abolished and such statements are admissible
only under one of the residual exceptions, it remains to be seen whether the declarant
must either be unavailable or stand ready to testify at trial. This assumes, of course, that
the proffered statement "is supported by 'a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness,"' Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980)). Although the Court has not explicitly answered this question, its decisions in
Wright and White v. Illinois suggest that an unavailability rule will not be imposed on the
admission of all hearsay proffered in criminal trials under Rule 803(24). Wright, 497 U.S.
at 815, 826-27; White, 502 U.S. at 354-56.
In Wright the Court refused to admit the statements of a declarant proffered under
Idaho's residual exception, essentially the same as the federal residuals. 497 U.S. at 812,
826-27. The Court, however, did not address the existence of an unavailability rule,
because the defendant did not argue that the declarant was available to testify. Id. at 816.
Instead, the Court determined that the statements, despite corroboration, were not
trustworthy. Id. at 826-27.
In White the Court held that an excited utterance was "firmly rooted," and therefore,
that the declarant's unavailability was immaterial. 502 U.S. at 353-57. In so doing, the
Court expressly rejected an unavailability test, narrowly construing Ohio v. Roberts as
"stand[ing] for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the
Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made
in the course of a prior judicial proceeding." Id at 354. The Court found that the
"substantial probative value" and "evidentiary value" of the testimony, coupled with the
indices of reliability inherent in an excited utterance, satisfied the constitutional standard.
Id. at 356. Thus, it appears that hearsay proffered under Rule 803(24) in a criminal trial
must meet two requirements: (1) the testimony must have "independent evidentiary
significance" that cannot be duplicated by the declarant on the witness stand; and (2) the
testimony must provide particular guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness. See Inadi,
475 U.S. at 394; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. One can envision circumstances where a res
gestae statement, proffered under Rule 803(24) would meet these requirements.
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proffered statement carries some indicium of "reliability" such as
contemporaneity or spontaneity.
If the res gestae exceptions are abolished, a judge operating
under the catch-all exceptions will be encouraged, indeed required, to
exclude the proffered hearsay and see that an available declarant
takes the stand. Furthermore, in those cases where the declarant is
unavailable, it is likely that corroborating testimony that is more
reliable and at least as probative as the proffered hearsay will be
"discovered" once it appears that the judge is determined to exclude
the hearsay. Such testimony can then be admitted in lieu of the
remote statement, and the remote statement can be excluded because
of its cumulative nature.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a reliability screening device, the hearsay rule is fundamental-
ly sound. It protects against the errant or fabricated statements of
remote declarants and in-court witnesses, and it helps to ensure that
the jury does not base its decision on untested hearsay. Because the
declarant is not subject to cross-examination, there must be additional
guarantors of trustworthiness to take its place before hearsay should
be admitted.
These procedural guarantors are found in the exceptions to the
basic exclusionary principle of the hearsay rule. Each exclusion is
based on some circumstantial factor which ensures that the evidence
is reliable, or that points to a high level of necessity. Although most
of the exceptions are rooted in accepted indicators of reliability, the
res gestae exceptions miss the mark.
The res gestae exceptions derive from the fallacy that the mental
effect of contemporaneity or excitement on a declarant is an
immediate heightening of perception and accurate recall, and an
abatement of the propensity to fabricate or misperceive an event.
Modern scholars have almost universally attacked these beliefs and
the continued admission of res gestae hearsay casts doubt on
judgments which appear to rely heavily on such statements.
Abolition of the res gestae exception, however, need not lead to
the categorical exclusion of all hearsay which would otherwise come
under its auspices. The residual exceptions to the hearsay rule
provide an established and acceptable means by which judges, acting
with appropriate discretion, may occasionally admit res gestae
statements which provide particular guarantees of reliability.
